Why does Korean war history emphasize finishing off retreating enemies? This article explores the deeply ingrained Korean war doctrine of “strike hard while you can,” tracing its roots to strategic necessity and historical battles like the Noryang Naval Battle and the Battle of Gwiju.
Core Belief: “You May Enter Freely, But You Won’t Leave Easily”
Korean military history is defined by one uncompromising doctrine: **kill as many enemies as possible when you get the chance.** This belief is exemplified in two of Korea’s most iconic battles: - Admiral Yi Sun-sin’s **Battle of Noryang** (1598) - General Gang Gam-chan’s **Battle of Gwiju** (1019) Both battles occurred not during the peak of invasion but during **enemy retreat**, a critical moment Korea historically used to deliver decisive, punishing blows.
Common Pattern: When the Enemy Retreats, Strike
In both the Noryang and Gwiju battles, Korean forces chose not to let the retreating enemy go — despite already defending their land. - The Gwiju Battle saw Gang Gam-chan risking all nine divisions to ambush a withdrawing Khitan army. - The Noryang Battle had Admiral Yi launching a final assault on Japanese forces who were preparing to leave Korea. From a foreign military perspective, these attacks may have seemed unnecessary or excessive. But in Korea’s context, **letting an enemy go was a future death sentence.**
Understanding the Motivation: Why Not Let Them Leave?
This doctrine didn’t stem from aggression, but from necessity. Korea’s geography, demographics, and resource base meant it couldn’t afford repeated wars. If an enemy withdrew unharmed, they would eventually regroup and return. **Korea couldn’t survive a second round.** That’s why Korean generals struck hardest during withdrawal — not out of cruelty, but to prevent future wars they knew they couldn’t win.
Why This Doctrine Formed on the Korean Peninsula
1. Persistent Resource and Population Disadvantage
Historically, Korea has always been **outnumbered and under-resourced** compared to its main enemies, especially China. - China had overwhelming population and material capacity. - Korea’s recovery after war was **slow and painful**, often requiring decades. Thus, wars weren’t just fought for victory — they were fought to **eliminate the chance of a second invasion.**
2. Poor Recovery Capacity After War
After war, Korea suffered: - Decreased population - Damaged farmland - Famine from drought Meanwhile, China or nomadic forces could replenish troops and resources quickly. Korea, however, **struggled to rebuild**, making even one war a national crisis.
3. Terrain and Economic Limitations
Korea’s land was not suitable for large-scale livestock farming like China or northern nomads. - Nomads could support multiple horses per soldier and move rapidly. - Korea’s environment barely allowed for basic agriculture, let alone mobile warfare. This made Korean defense strategies **static and brutal** — favoring traps and fortress defense over open battle.
4. Naval and Material Disadvantages Against Japan
During the Imjin War, Japan had: - Nearly **twice the population** of Joseon Korea - **Superior shipbuilding resources**, including abundant and higher-quality cedar for warships Korea’s only chance was to reduce Japan’s naval power before withdrawal — hence the strategic importance of Noryang.
Historical Consistency: Earlier Cases in Korean History
This doctrine wasn’t new in Yi or Gang’s time. Earlier examples show the same pattern: - **Sal-su Battle** in Goguryeo: Ambush and drown retreating Sui soldiers. - **General Jeong Seong** attacking Khitan forces retreating across the Yalu River during their second invasion. Korea has always struck hardest not when the enemy arrives, but **when they try to leave.**
Foreign Misunderstanding: Chen Lin and Admiral Yi
Even allies didn’t always understand this strategy. During the Noryang Battle, Ming Admiral **Chen Lin** questioned the necessity of engaging a retreating Japanese fleet. But Admiral Yi knew better: letting them leave with their warships would enable Japan to return. For Korea, **there was no “next war” — only survival or extinction.**
Repetition and the Lesson of Goguryeo
Korea’s fear wasn’t misplaced. - **Goguryeo defeated Chinese invasions seven times.** - On the **eighth time**, they lost — and the kingdom fell. Koreans learned: **it only takes one loss to be erased.** Thus, enemies must be crushed completely when the opportunity arises.
Conclusion: A Doctrine of Desperation, Not Aggression
The Korean war doctrine — **strike hardest during retreat** — is not rooted in vengeance but in strategic desperation. When you cannot outproduce or out-recover your enemies, you must **eliminate them when you can.** That is why battles like Gwiju and Noryang define Korea’s military identity: precise, focused, and designed for survival against overwhelming odds.
