Was Syngman Rhee truly a pro-Japanese collaborator? Or was he an anti-Japanese strategist who simply used collaborators for power? This article explores both.👇
1. Historical Evaluation: Rhee’s Use of Collaborators vs His Own Ideology
1.1 Why Rhee Appointed Pro-Japanese Officials
Rhee did indeed appoint many former pro-Japanese figures—especially those from the colonial police and military ranks. His rationale was strategic: these individuals, fearing post-liberation punishment, offered Rhee fierce loyalty in exchange for protection. Rhee used this to consolidate his power base.
Criticism of this move is valid. However, it’s crucial to distinguish between Rhee using collaborators and being one himself. He saw those loyal to him as useful tools in building a centralized government under his strong authority.
1.2 Rhee’s Uncompromising Anti-Japanese Stance
Despite employing former collaborators, Rhee personally held an unyielding anti-Japanese position. Internationally, he was known as the most anti-Japanese Korean leader. Even during the Korean War, when the U.S. hinted at involving Japanese troops, Rhee responded sharply, saying Korean forces would drown them in the sea before letting them set foot in Korea again.
His stance was so hostile that it even caused friction with his American allies. To Rhee, Japan was not merely a former colonizer—it was a barbaric threat, echoing centuries-old Joseon-era perceptions of Japan.
2. The Peace Line and the Dokdo Strategy
2.1 Establishing the Peace Line
Rhee unilaterally drew the "Peace Line" (also known internationally as the Rhee Line) in Korean waters, claiming territorial rights including the Dokdo islets. This move was made before Japan officially regained sovereignty post-WWII, giving Korea a strategic edge.
Japan saw it as an act of aggression, but Rhee framed it as a gesture of restraint: “We could do worse, but we choose peace.” In practice, Korean forces detained Japanese fishing vessels and exchanged captured fishermen for the release of Korean detainees in Japan.
2.2 Dokdo Secured Through Strategic Timing
While the Peace Line was eventually abolished under international pressure, Korea extracted major concessions—$90 million in aid and an implicit acceptance of its control over Dokdo. This tactic solidified Korea’s de facto sovereignty over the islets, which remains today.
3. Understanding Rhee’s Identity and Era
3.1 Was Rhee Himself a Collaborator?
Rhee’s use of collaborators does not make him one. He never showed sympathy or softness toward Japan. His deep cultural view of Japan as an "uncivilized other" shaped his policies and language. He saw himself not as a modern democrat, but more like a Joseon-era noble or monarch.
3.2 The U.S. Military Government’s Role
After liberation, the U.S. Military Government in Korea prioritized anti-communist stability over purging collaborators. They retained colonial police and bureaucrats for efficiency. This pragmatic but morally flawed decision allowed many pro-Japanese figures to remain in power—many of whom then aligned with Rhee out of necessity.
The U.S. was even criticized by American outlets like the New York Times for continuing imperial structures under the guise of democracy. Rhee’s authoritarian tendencies overlapped with this structure, making it hard to cleanly sever colonial legacies.
4. The Joseon Mindset and Power Politics
Rhee viewed loyalty as the highest political virtue. He believed those who served him well—even if formerly problematic—were serving the country. His political philosophy mirrored the old Confucian mindset where rulers guided the people like shepherds, not equals.
This top-down paternalism explains how he could justify harsh crackdowns and still believe he acted in national interest. His critics label this arrogance; his supporters call it conviction. Either way, it was a product of his upbringing in 19th-century Joseon Korea.
5. Rhee’s Vision for Technological Sovereignty
5.1 Korea’s Historical Affinity for Technology
Koreans have long been tech-inclined. Joseon’s artillery technology was among the best during the Imjin War. The later decline in innovation was due to internal turmoil—not cultural aversion to science.
5.2 Rhee’s Early Push for Nuclear Technology
Post-liberation Korea felt inferior in weapons and science compared to Japan and the West. Rhee, recognizing this, prioritized nuclear development early in his presidency—long before it became fashionable.
This national ambition, shared by later leaders like Park Chung-hee, reflected a broader Korean instinct: technological advancement was key to survival and pride after decades of colonization and war.
Conclusion: Rhee Was Anti-Japan, Not Pro-Collaborator
Syngman Rhee was not a morally clean figure. He was a dictator who used collaborators and suppressed opposition. But he was never pro-Japanese. He despised Japan, resisted U.S. pressure to cooperate with it, and took bold steps to reclaim Korean sovereignty—especially over Dokdo.
To understand Rhee, we must see him as a man of a different time. His worldview was shaped in a Joseon-era context, and his actions—however controversial—stemmed from a deep belief in Korean strength and autonomy.
